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Summary
There is disagreement in the literature about whether monopoly
ownership of morning and evening newspapers within a city influence
advertising rates. This paper investigates the effects of advertising
rates of morning and evening newspapers which are separately and/or
jointly owned, in cities with a morning and evening newspaper. On
most assumptions the price of advertising in either the morning or
evening paper, purchased by itself, will be higher with monopoly
ownership. But the price of advertising in both the evening and
morning paper together is shown to be theoretically undeterminate. This
analysis, using data from 1963 and 1976, shows that it is 8-19 percent
more expensive to advertise in one paper in a a one-owner town. But
it is considerably cheaper to advertise in both papers where both are
owned by the same firm.

THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MONOPOLISTIC OWNERSHIP IN NEWSPAPERS
Julian L. Simon, Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. and Edward Rice*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is disagreement in the literature about whether monopoly
ownership of morning and evening newspapers within a city influences
advertising rates. The most recent review concluded "The effects of
media ownership concentration can be expressed in the well-known scotch
verdict: 'Not Proved'." (Eaer et al
.
, 1974, p. ix). The aim of this
paper is to resolve the question.
The study also has a more general implication. The empirical price
and allocation effects of monopoly that have been reported in the eco-
nomic literature have mostly been small relative to relevant magnitudes.
These reports have affected the thinking of economists and perhaps of
policy makers. As Tullock put it:
The results have uniformly shown very small costs for practices
that economists normally deplore. Judging from conversations
with graduate students, a number of young economists are draw-
ing the conclusion that tariffs and monopolies are not of much
importance. This view is now beginning to appear in the liter-
ature (Tullock, 1973, p. 187).
Newspaper markets provide an unusual opportunity to compare the
effect of monopoly against joint ownership. We examine the prices of
advertising in cities of comparable size when there are both evening
and morning newspapers, in some cases separately owned and in other
*Simon and Primeaux are at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and Rice is at the University of Washington, Seattle. We
acknowledge, with thanks, the research assistance of Randy Nelson and
Nikhil Varaiva.
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cases owned by a single firm. In contrast to the view Tullock describes,
this article shows rather large effects in at least one industry—but in
both directions! It may be that similar large effects are obscured from
view in interindustry studies because of the immense statistical noise
introduced by the structural differences among industries.
Here i9 some necessary terminology and institutional information.
The market structure we call "monopoly" is a single firm owning both the
morning and evening newspapers in a given city. A "forced combination"
exists when a monopolist owns both morning and evening papers and forces
advertisers to buy ads in both papers as a condition of advertising in
the single paper of their choice. An "optional combination" monopoly
situation is one in which an advertiser can advertise in one or both
papers. "Agency" ownership is where the papers are separate editorially
but have a common agency to sell their advertising; in all observed
cases their production facilities also are common. "Separate ownership"
is where the papers are separately owned and operated.
II. SOME THEORY
The "forced combination" purchase of newspaper advertising (adver-
tisers being forced to buy space in both morning and evening papers) has
been the subject of a long crusade for abolition or change by the
Association of National Advertisers and advertising agencies. As of
twenty-five years ago (Borden et al. 1946, pp. 461-464) this subject
had come up for review and criticism at annual trade association meet-
ings for over 20 years. According to Borden et al.
,
publishers owning
both morning and evening papers have good reason for preferring to quote
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a price for only the combination of papers rather than prices for the
individual papers: Expenses for selling and handling advertising are
proportionally less if advertising orders are taken for the entire cir-
culation covered by both papers rather than for the papers individually.
"Some of the lowest millines available in the various circulation groups
are these forced combinations ..." Eorden et al. (1946, pp. 461-462).
In an aside which has theoretical import, Eorden et al. said:
[I]f many national advertisers resent a forced com-
bination rate, it would appear to us sound business sense
to quote rates for the individual papers. Advertisers
would expect the millines for the individual papers to be
higher than the millines of the combination buy. To make
them arbitrarily high, relative to the norm for the cir-
culation offered, would, however, defeat the purpose of
dropping a forced combination, which is to gain and retain
customers' goodwill by giving them a fair price for what
they want to buy. (1946, p. 464, italics added)
That is, monopolists cay price individual newspapers higher than if they
did not also offer a combination purchase, so as to Increase sales of
the combination purchase.
The closest formal theory is Bowman's analysis of tying. The sit-
uation discussed by Bowman is clearly reflected in the Tices-Ficayune
case. The Tires-Picayune , New Orleans' largest newspaper, required per-
sons wishing to advertise in that morning paper to take identical ads
in The States , an evening paper. An antitrust violation, by virtue of
a tying arrangement, was charged by the Justice Department. Although
the facts in the Times-Picayune case seem to indicate a tying arrange-
ment in an economic sense, the Supreme Court found New Orleans' largest
newspaper publisher innocent of violating Sherman Act Section 1. "Not-
withstanding the Supreme Court's arguments to the contrary, this was a
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clearcut tying arrangement. But it did have the merit of permitting
typesetting and composition cost savings." (Scherer, 1970, p. 506)
The two newspaper situation is more complex than comprehended by
tying theory, however. These two questions must be addressed: In
monopoly, as compared to duopoly, (1) what will be the price of adver-
tising in just one newspaper? (2) what will be the total price of ad-
vertising in both newspapers when there are printing cost economies in
monopoly? We shall see that the answers depend upon the assumptions
made about costs, elasticities and cross-elasticities.
The simplest assumptions will not do. For example, if one makes
assumptions akin to those in Stigler's block-booking discussion (1968,
Chapter 15)
—
postulating demands for advertising in the two papers inde-
pendent of each other, and a single yes-no decision about whether or not
to advertise—it is possible to construct cases in which, after a shift
to monopoly, (a) all prices go up, (b) the joint price goes down while
separate prices go up, or (c) all prices go down. The latter is im-
plausible in light of the simplest static analysis of the effect of low-
er elasticity of demand in each of two newspapers monopolistically owned
and ncn-interactively competitive than when each is owned separately and
each owner is trying to maximize its own profit. Therefore a more com-
plex formal analysis is necessary, one which includes rivalry, cost re-
ductions for the joint product in monopoly, and various possible assump-
tions about elasticities.
The equilibrium concept we shall use for our duopoly case is a Nash
non-cooperative equilibrium, with strategies for the firms defined by
the prices they charge
"
(similar co the Bertrand oligopoly model assump-
tion). Advertising in one newspaper is assumed to be an imperfect
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substitute for advertising In the other newspaper, and both are imper-
fect substitutes for a third product—advertising in both newspapers.
This should become clearer in the presentation below.
We assume that demand is as follows in the relevant range.
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This demand framework embodies two simplifying assumptions: 1) the de-
mand for each separate paper is symmetric with that of the other sepa-
rate paper (for exposition only) ; and 2) all demand curves are linear
in all prices.
Marginal costs are assumed constant, and the sane for each separate
newspaper (i.e., C- = C„). Please note that if all goods are priced at
marginal cost in the monopoly production situation, A and B represent
the quantity demanded of advertising in separate newspapers, and in both
newspapers, respectively.
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Now, consider the duopoly situation. Eere price of the joint ad-
vertising necessarily equals the sum of the individual prices; i.e.,
P., = P.. + P-. Then each duopolist, according to our assumptions, solves
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If the constraint is not binding, we obtain from the first-order con-
ditions these optimal prices
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These solutions are complex, reflecting some of the complexity of the
problem itself. But a few general observations can be made.
1. The monopolists' optimization formula would suffice for mana-
gerial decision making purposes. However, a much simpler approximation
method using tabular analysis would make less demands on data and re-
quire less restrictive assumptions, and would therefore be preferrable.
(See Simon, 1975, Chapter 4).
2. With certain constraints upon the parameters to avoid palpably
unlikely outcomes—for example, a must be at least as great as a_, for
X E
otherwise total advertising increases when P» is raised—we can obtain some
results about the effect of cost changes. One such is that -_M
3C
3
> 0.*
Demand
Constant
That is, if there are cost savings in joint production, these will be
reflected in lower monopolist prices on the joint product than other-
wise. Though the effect of cost reduction on the individual product
prices is ambiguous, that monopolist reductions in both joint and indi-
vidual prices following cost reduction in joint production is a possi-
bility.
D M
3. Examination of the optimizing solutions for P and P_ shows
non-linear terms and interactive effects. This suggests that there is
not likely to be any unidirectional conclusion that can be drawn about
JA D
the relationship of PI to P . And experiments with differencing the
two optima and other analytic devices did indeed not reveal any simple
*Proof of this proposition is in the appendix. The proof requires mak-
ing some further reasonable assumptions about the nature of the demand
system.
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conclusion, even in this case of linear demand functions. >!bre conclu-
sively, ve have constructed examples with the denand function alone
(i.e., assuming no change in Joint cost) that show that all sorts of
outcomes are possible if duopoly becomes monopoly (or vice versa). Two
such example follow:
Example A; Close substitutes . If there is high substitutability
between the three products, then there will be large effects of one
product's price upon the other products' demand. In our model this
means that a_, &„, and a_ will be large relative to a and aT .
In such a situation, the monopolizing effect of joint ownership is
likely to predominate, and all prices will rise. For example, suppose
a = .3 ^ = .15 aB
= .07 B = 25 A = 30
a_ - .15 a„ = .04 C = 100 C = 100 C = 200
Substituting into our optimum solutions,
D D MM
pj = ?!; = $196.49 PT = p£ = $278.57
P° = $392.98 P^1 = $414.29
As expected, both prices are higher with monopoly ownership in this case,
Example B: Not close substitutes, demand for the joint product
more elastic . If there is not close substitutability in the demand for
the three products, price discrimination considerations will likely
dominate. If the demand for the joint product is more elastic than the
demand for the individual newspapers at duopoly prices, the monopolist
-9-
is likely to raise the individual product prices and lower the joint
product price.
For example, let
a = .3 a^ = .08 a^ = .04 B = 25 A = 30
a_ = .15 a_ = .02 C. = 100 C„ = 100 C, = 200
Notice that here the cross-coefficients (a^, a , and a ) are approxi-
mately half what they were in Example A. The solutions are
D D MM
P
l
=
2
= $ 169 ' 62 Pl
= P
2
= $185 ' 13
P° = $339.24 P^ = $316.98
As expected, joint price is lower but individual prices are higher with
monopoly ownership.*
In short, the model implies that unambiguous predictions about price
behavior are impossible when newspapers switch from duopoly to monopoly
ownership. What happens will depend on three separate factors and their
relative importance: 1) substitutability between products, which causes
all monopoly prices to be higher, ceteris paribus; 2) price elasticity
differences, which cause a lower monopoly joint-product price and higher
individual prices if the joint product has higher elasticity; 3) cost
savings from joint production, which cause lower monopoly joint-product
price, and an uncertain effect on individual product prices.
*Please note that at the duopoly prices, the price elasticity of demand
for the joint product is $5.25, while for the individual products it is
$2.91. Also note that we are not explicitly considering the (relatively
uninteresting) situation where the individual product demand is more
elastic, since price discrimination in this direction is ruled out by
buyer arbitrage. The sum of the individual prices must be at least as
great as the joint product price, otherwise demanders would simply buy
two separate ads and effectively obtain a joint product.
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There is still another reason to think that the comparative joint-
product price levels are theoretically indeterminate. The duopoly price
level, P_ = P. + P«, depends upon the extent of competition between the
duopolist, and it has been shown that no one price can be deduced as the
unique duopoly equilibrium (see Simon, Puig and Aschoff, 1973).*
The variety of possible effects in theory means that empirical in-
vestigation is necessary. The remainder of the paper is devoted to that
task.
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Simon and Bowers (Simon, 1970, p. 152-163) constructed a set of
pairwise comparisons of cities of similar size. These shoved that if
the advertiser wishes to purchase advertising in only a morning or
evening newspaper, it is cheaper to do so with separate ownership, but
if the advertiser wishes to purchase advertising in both morning and
evening newspapers, it is cheaper to do so if there is monopoly owner-
ship.
Grctta (1970) examined advertising rates before and after a shift
from separate ownership to monopoly ownership. Ee found that the price
of advertising in a single paper was higher after the merger. Ke did
not offer a conclusion about the monopoly effect on single-paper adver-
tising.
The main objective of Owen (1973) was to study the effect of joint
ownership of newspapers and television stations. Most of his work was
*By assuming Nash equilibrium with price strategies, we are imposing a
particular form of competition.
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/
with the advertising rate unadjusted for newspaper circulation, which
is not appropriate for our purposes here (and, it has been argued by
others, for Owen's other purposes as well). But Oven did show results
of a single regression for the milline-rate cost of advertising in both
evening and morning papers in 1969. Separate ownership is associated
with a rate approximately 13.5% higher.
As noted in the introduction, the sum of this earlier evidence has
not convinced interested persons that any effect has been proven con-
clusively, probably both because of shortcomings in the data and analysis,
and because of a lack of theory.
IV. PROCEDURE AND DATA
The all-important "irrelevant" variable which must be controlled
is total circulation. The relationship of circulation to price is seen
in plots to be rather clearly logarithmic, and it is therefore entered
into the regressions in that form. The market-structure variable is
handled with a two-way dummy. Equations are of the form:
Y = a + b^ + b
2
X
2
where: Y = milline rate charged by the newspaper, in natural logs
X. = circulation in numbers of newspapers sold, in natural logs
X_ = a zero-one dummy variable to reflect difference in levels
of concentration.
We collected data for the years 1963 and 1976. Adding yearly
observations adds information. However, the advertising rates of news-
papers are highly correlated from year to year, and hence the additional
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information value of additional yearly samples at closer intervals is
limited. In light of the expected cost and benefit of that additional
information, and in light of our results, we believe that the 1963 and
1976 samples taken together give us a satisfactory picture of the sit-
uation. The data for the two years were collected separately by dif-
ferent graduate students, which adds to our confidence in our empirical
results.
A three-step procedure was followed to assign the firms to market
structure categories. First, firms were selected from the list provided
in Bowers (1966). Second, a cross check of this list was conducted by
using data from Standard Rate and Data Service. If Eowers listed a firm
as offering an optional combination but only a forced rate was actually
offered to advertisers, the firm was classified in the forced narket
category. If a firm was listed by Bowers as offering only a forced
combination but an optional combination was actually offered, the firm
was moved to the optional market structure. Third, Editor and Publisher
of 1963 and 1976 was inspected to determine if two same-city firms were
joined by a common advertising agency; papers operating with this type
of arrangement are called "agency papers" and an agency market structure
is included in the analysis.
Firms were excluded from the sample when published data were incom-
plete. Also, all observations for a city were excluded from the sample
if one of the papers had discontinued publication since 1963. The size
of the sample varied depending upon the market structure being examined
at any given time. The number of firms representing each market struc-
ture type, for each year, is shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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RESULTS
Tables 1-3 present the results of regressions for advertising in
evening newspapers and morning newspapers separately, and for both papers
together, respectively, in the various market structures.
Eefore we proceed to our main topic, it is worth noting that the cir-
culation variable in every regression indicates large effects of scale,
the elasticity ranging from -.25 to -.53. In regressions run separately
on the various classes of newspapers; the range is -.22 to -.51, and
the mean elasticity is -.38. That is, doubling the circulation reduces
the cost of reaching a reader with a page of advertising by 33%. When
one remembers that daily newspapers range in circulation from less than
10,000 to nearly two million in the U.S.—in our sample the range is
from 14,131 to 722,897—the importance of these price effects of scale
becomes clear. ' Eow much of this effect is due to economies in newspaper
preparation, hew much to the selling and processing of advertising, and
how much to physical production, is not known to us.
Now on to our main business.
Advertising in One Paper
Evening newspapers considered by themselves, and morning newspapers
considered by themselves, are much the same economically; therefore
we shall analyze the two cases together though keeping the samples
separate. We pool the 1963 and 1976 results to increase the generality
of our results. But we also present comparisons in the two separate
years because there can be change over time.
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For evening and morning newspapers purchased alone, the dummy-var-
iable coefficients in the top line of Tables 1 and 2 show that it is
S% to 19% cheaper to advertise in a separately-owned paper than when
both the morning and evening papers are owned by the sane firm.*. ,The
result is much the same in 1963 and in 1976. The coefficient for morning
papers in 1976 would not be significant if examined alone, but given
that its sign is consistent with the other three observations, we can
be confident that the result is not a statistical artifact, though it
may signal a shift over time. A comparison of pairs of papers at similar
circulations for 1963 (Table 3) suggests that the differential is even
greater than shown by the less flexible dummy variable technique, say
2C-30%, and the consistency of the results is also made clear in the
pairwise comparisons.
The second lines in Tables 1 and 2 show the comparisons of agency
(cartel) operation to separate operation: Agency prices are higher
(though not so much so in 1976 as to be statistically significant if
that were the only data available; this may indicate a shift over time).
The results in the third lines in Tables 1 and 2 show no pattern of
differences between agency ownership and monopoly ownership.
The difference between monopolies and agencies on the one hand, and
individual ownership on the ether hand, together with the similarity of
agencies to joint ownership, may be due either to production economies
*The coefficients on the dummy variables may not immediately be in-
terpreted as percent differences. Since the base differs, depending upon
the level at which the change occurs, the coefficients must be converted
to percentage differences by referring to a table of exponential func-
tions. The percentage differences mentioned in this section were con-
verted by using the table in Selby (1967, p. 141).
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of scale (the agency papers are produced jointly), or to the power to
set prices for both papers together. Our data do not allow us to dis-
criminate between the two explanations.
Advertising in Evening and Morning Newspapers Together
Table A shows the results for the comparisons of the various patterns
of control and sale of advertising in morning and evening newspapers to-
gether.
Lines 1 and 2 contain the most important results. Line 1 shows the
comparison of morning-plus-evening advertising bought from separately-
owned papers versus a purchase from a monopolist who forces the adver-
tiser to buy the advertising as a package. Line 2 compares a combina-
tion purchase from separate owners against an optional combination
purchase from a monopolist. Both comparisons make very clear that an
advertiser pays 25% to 30% less when buying from a monopolist. The
size and the certainty of this effect may be seen in detail in the sample
of 1963 pairwise comparisons available at similar circulation rates, in
Table 5.
The result—that monopoly prices are lower—runs against general
economic expectations. But it does accord with the theory developed
earlier.
Line 3—comparing agency rates to separate-ownership rates—shows
a result quite similar to the comparisons in lines 1 and 2. This sug-
gests that agencies price in a manner quite similar to monopoly owner-
ship. This confirms our result about the lowering of joint-purchase
prices with joint control and production.
-16-
Lin.es A and 5 show no noticeable difference between combination
prices charged by agencies and by single ownership. These comparisons
fit together with line 3 to show that agencies act like the cartels that
they are. Taken altogether, the results .yield a strong and consistent
pattern: Joint control produces lower prices when one advertises in
both morning and evening papers together.
Line 6 shows no differences between optional and forced combina-
tions in 1963, but a statistically-large effect in 1976 (forced combina-
tions apparently charging less). Whether this represents a real change
or a statistical artifact cannot be known without additional data. Nor
is it of great interest for this paper; we present it mostly for com-
pleteness.
V. DISCUSSION
In addition to our theory given earlier, there is another approach
to the monopolist's behavior, which results in observed higher single-
paper prices and lower joint prices, implicit in the statement of Borden
et al. quoted earlier. We can observe that the higher is the single-
paper price, the greater the likelihood that the customer will advertise
in both papers together. That is, the spread between the single-paper
and joint-paper prices may be thought of as a price tool of the monop-
olist. This would be difficult to show formally or even with examples,
because of the inter-relationship between this effect and the ter. ' ency
of single-paper prices to be higher in monopoly due to the simplest
elasticity effect. It can, however, easily be shown with sequential
analysis of likely decision-making thinking when going for duopoly to
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monopoly with the cost structure remaining the same, but we will not
bore the reader with this. Eut there is ample empirical evidence that
this logic actually operates. The behavior of monopolists who force
all advertisers to advertise in both papers, offering no individual-paper
rates, clearly shows a tendency for this spread-widening to happen; the
price of having to buy advertising in both papers in order to advertise
in just one newspaper, even if that is all that you want, is a very high
price, indeed, and hence the spread is very great in that case.
Evaluating the impact of monopoly is difficult because in most in-
dustries, e.g., auto manufacturing or canned ham, there is only one mar-
ket. Most studies of monopoly have therefore been comparisons across
industries (Schwartzman, 1959; 1960 is an exception). And, the results
of such comparisons across industries are always subject to the impor-
tant qualification that the observed differences may stem from the spe-
cific natures of the industries, rather than from the degree of concen-
tration and the other independent variables.
There are two main empirical strategies in the social sciences,
which are used respectively in economics and in psychology. Economists
usually aim at wide coverage of the economy and therefore use the cross-
industry approach, with all its strengths and weaknesses. In contrast,
psychologists examine the behavior of a narrow sample of homogeneous
subject matter under tightly controlled conditions, for example, a labora-
tory experiment using rats to study a topic in learning theory. In this
paper, as in Primeaux (1975), we adopt a research strategy more akin to
that of the psychologists, by working with a homogeneous sample of the
same type of firm in a sample of locations. While this strategy limits
generality, it increases the reliability of the empirical analysis.
-13-
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the effect on advertising rates of morning
and evening newspapers being separately owned or jointly owned, in cities
with a morning and an evening newspaper. On most assumptions the price
of advertising In either the morning or the evening paper, purchased
by itself, will be higher with monopoly ownership. Eut the price of
advertising in both the evening and morning paper together is shown to
be theoretically Indeterminate. Therefore we examined data for 1963 and
1976. We found that it is 8-19% more expensive to advertise in one paper
in a one-owner town. Eut it is considerably cheaper to advertise in
both papers where both are owned by the same firm. Whether this is due
to production economies of scale or a pricing scheme that would lead to
2
this result even in the absence of economies of scale we do rot know.
i
Separately-owned papers that produce and sell jointly have prices simi-
lar to single-owner situations.
6
it
a
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APPENDIX
This appendix derives the duopoly and monopoly price solutions and
proves the proposition that 3PM/3C > stated in the text. It thus
explicitly solves the maximization problems referred to in the text
(and imposes the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in the duopoly case).
Duopoly Solution
Let K. = P. - C. for each product i. Then, the optimization forill
duopolist firm 1 (morning newspaper) is
max K (Q + Q-)
.
P
l
Taking the derivative with respect to P , one obtains the first-order
/
condition
Qi
+ Q 3
+ K
i
(iP7 + iP7)
=0
-
From the form of the demand functions assumed, noting that in the duopoly
case P_ = P + P„, this reduces to
Q
L
+ Q3 + Kx (-a s + a£ + aB
- a
T
) =0
A + B + (a
B
-a
s
) K]
_
+ (a^) K
2
+ (a^) K
3
+ ^ (a^-a^) =
(Al) A + B + Cag+ap) K
2
+ (a
£
-a
T
) K
3
+ (a
E
+2a
B
-2a
s
-a
T
) ^ - 0.
Let C = C. + C_ - C,. Then note that
s 1 2 3
K
3
= P
3
- C
3
= (P
1
+ p
2
) - (c
x
+ c
2
) + (c
L
+ c
2
- c
3 )
(A2) K, = K. + K_ + C .
3 12s
-2-
Substituting (A2) into (Al) and combining terms
A + B + (a
£
-a
T
) C
s
+ (a^+a^) K
2
+ U^+f,-^ K± =
A + B + (a
E
-a
T
) C
s
+ U^a^a^) K
2 <(A3) K
l
=
2(a
s+
a
T
-a
B
-a
E )
Now, the solution for duopolist 2 is exactly the same as for 1, in (A3),
except duopolist 2 switches K.. and K- . By invoking this symmetry relation-
* *
ship in the case of linear functions we know that K. = K? .
Thus, from (A3), in equilibrium,
^S+VVe) Kl = A + B + (aE- aT } C s + < aB+aD+aE- aT ) K l
(2a
s+
3a
T
-3a
B
-3a
E
-a
D
) K]
_
= A + B + (a^) C
s
* A + B + (a -a ) C
(A4) K. = ^——z ^-^ '
1 2a
s
+3a
T
-3a
B
-3a
E
-a
D
Equation (A4) is reorganized in the text as
* A + B - (a -a ) C
(A5) P
n
= =-
-r_
*
-j ,
S
+ C,
1 2a
s+
3a
T
-3(a
B+
a
E
)-a
D
1
Monopoly Solution
The monopolist problem is
max K Q. + K„ Q- + K Q .
P P PW 3
Setting the partial derivative with respect to P
?
equal to zero yields
3Q, 3Q 2 3Qo\ + K l 1T
±
+ K
2 3P7
+ K
3 1T
±
=
°
or Q l " a s
K
l
+ % K2 + aB K 3 = °-
-3-
Substituting from the demand function for Q ,
A - 2a
s
K
±
+ 2% K 2 + (a^) K3 =
* A + 2a K + (a +a ) K
(A6) K, = U
la.
s
By symmetry, the first order condition for P_ yields
(A7) K„ =
*
A + 2ap Ki
+ <yy K3
2 " 2a
s
Differentiating with respect to P.,, the resulting first order condi-
tion is
3Q3 3Q, 3Q 2
Q 3 + K3 TV~
+ K
l 3Pj + K 2 3Pj = °
or Q 3
- a
T
K
3
+ a^k^ + K
2
> = .
Substituting for Q_ from the demand equations,
B + (a
B
+a
E
) (K
1
+K
2
) - 2a
T
K
3
=
* B + (a +a ) (K +K )
(A8) K. = f—£
1
—±-
.
3 2a
T
Examining first-order conditions (A6)
,
(A7) , and (A8) , one first
notices that the symmetry and linearity of (A6) and (A7) implies that
K = K_. This fact reduces (A6) to
*
A + (a
B
+a
E )
K
3
,
»D *
1 2a a 1
s s
A + (a
B+
a
E
) K
3(a
s"
a
D )
K
l
=
2
* A + (a +a ) K
(A9) K* =
_,
B
g 1 .
Substituting (A9) into (A8) and noting that K. = K
,
-4-
K
*
_
_B_
+
(W [A + (aB+a E ) K*] .
3 " 2aT
2a
T
( a
s
-a
D
)
K
*
m
B(a
s
-a
D
) + A(aB+a E )
+
(a^a/
3 2a
T
(a
3
"a
D )
2a
T
(VV 3
K
3 ^VVV " (VaE )2] " B(V aD)+A(aB+a E )
* B(a -a ) + A(a +a )
(A10) K Q =
2a
T
(a
S
-a
D ) " (V3E )2
Substituting (A10) into (A9) gives
*
_1 f , , (aB+V [^VV +A(VaE )] 1K
l
=
2 (a -a_) {A + ——. I ; ^ ,2
}
s D 2a
T<VV " (aB+aE }
1 ^VVV +B(VaE)(VaD )
{
- "
- -5 " }
2 (a -a_.) „ , , ,
,
v2
s D 2a
T
(araD ) - (a^)
*
2A a
T
+ B (a
B
+a
E )(All) K, =
4a
T (V aD ) " 2(3B+aE )2
Equations (All) and (A10) , reported in price form in the text, translate to
2A a + B(a +ar )
(A12) P = P = i 2—S -+ C , and
Aa^a.-a^) - 2^/
*
BCVV + A(aB+aE }(A13) P
3
= ?_2 ?_L_ + C;j
2a
T
(as-V- (aB+aEr
-5-
Proof that 3p!?/3C
3
>
As stated in the footnote in the text, to keep demand constant
while C. changes, we must change A and B simultaneously. The relevant
equation is
3P
M
ac.
3P
M
3P
M
3P
M
+ a T
Demand
Constant
3C_ E 3A
- a
T 3B
From (A13) then,
3C,
= 1 +
DC
a
E
(VaE ) " VVV
2a
T
(a
s-
a
D ) "
(a
B
+a
E }
'
2a
T
(a
s
_a
D ) "
(a
B
+a
E
} + a
E
(a
B
+a
E
}
" VVV
2a
T
(a
s-
aD ) " (aB+aE }
'
(A14) 3P
M
3C.
DC
a
T
(a
s"
a
D ) I
a
B
(VaE )
2a
T (VaD ) " (aB+aEY
Now, we assume that a $1 rise in P, and P_ , coupled with a $2 rise
in P- would result in smaller Q 1 , Q„ and Q-.
This implies that
(A15) a
T "
a
B
for otherwise Q. would rise in the situation described.
We further assume that raising any one price will result in less
total advertising (2Q + Q + Q )
.
This implies that
(A16) a > a^ + 2a and
(A17)
^ "
a
E
-6-
Also note that the denominator of (A13) must be positive for an inter-
ior solution.
Then, from (A14) , using (A16)
,
(A18)
3P
M
3C.
a,„ (2a„) - a'
T B B
a„ a„
B E
DC
3P
M
3C.
2a„,(a -a„) - (a^+a,,)'
T s D BE
a
B
[(a
T
-a
B
) + (a^) ]
DC 2a
T
(a
s
-a
D
) - (a^)*"
The denominator of (A18) is positive since it is the same as the denomina-
tor of (A13) . The numerator of (A18) must be positive from (A17) and (A15)
Hence, the entire (A18) must be positive and our proof is complete.
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